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Telemedicine is the New Narcotics Candy Store:
Teladoc Opens the Floodgates for the Unrestricted
Sale of Dangerous Drugs
Madeleine Rosuck*
I. INTRODUCTION
From the emergence and utilization of advanced technology comes the
incredible advancement of medicine. The introduction of technological inno-
vations bolsters traditional medical devices, increases access to health care,
lowers the cost of obtaining health care, and improves the overall standard of
health care. Telemedicine is one such innovation.
The Texas Occupations Code defines a “Telehealth Service” as “a
health service . . . delivered by a health professional . . . to a patient at a
different physical location than the health professional using telecommunica-
tions or information technology.”1 Individuals can obtain access to telehealth
services through a telemedicine provider for a per-member subscription fee.2
Patients create a personal account which contains their complete medical his-
tory and medical records.3 Patients in need of medical consultations submit a
request online, which is accepted by a board-certified physician employed by
the telemedicine provider, and the consultation takes place via telephone.4
The physician can offer the patient medical advice, refer the patient to a
brick-and-mortar office for an in person evaluation, or prescribe the patient
medication.5
People increasingly accept and utilize the telemedicine model. The
shortage of physicians in the United States, coupled with the associated in-
creased cost of health care services and the decrease in face time with physi-
cians, makes the telemedicine system appealing because it allows patients to
avoid these problems and obtain medical advice quickly, conveniently, and
cheaply.6 Consequently, states like Texas, with historically low health care
coverage numbers, invested early in telemedicine and continue to greatly
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1. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 111.001(3) (West 2017).





6. See Caroline M. Poma, Telemedicine: A Therapeutic Prescription for Our
Health Care System Contaminated by Old Economy Rules and Regulations, 17
N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 74, 77, 79 (2016).
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support its use—especially among populations facing geographical or eco-
nomic barriers to obtaining health care.7
Overall, benefits stemming from the use of telemedicine (e.g., lowered
costs, increased access, and improved quality of care)8 have been significant
and have contributed to telemedicine’s popularity and acclaim.9 But, as is the
case with all relatively new and complex innovations, there are many legal
implications that the courts have yet to sort out, especially regarding the re-
strictions and limitations imposed on telemedicine services.
The statutory and constitutional issues associated with the telemedicine
model that lack judicial clarity are exemplified in Teladoc, Inc. v. Texas
Medical Board. Here, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas (Court) misinterprets a telemedicine statute resulting in an erroneous
holding which has had far-reaching constitutional and practical implications.
This case note examines the Court’s erroneous interpretation of
§ 190.8(1)(L) of the Texas Administrative Code (TAC) as a global restriction
applying to all drugs prescribed through the telemedicine model. This over-
broad interpretation and application of the statute by the Court caused it to
grant the requested preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the
TAC, overreaching its authority and intruding on the state’s explicit police
power. The correct interpretation would find the limitation applies only to the
prescription of the dangerous drugs and controlled substances listed in the
statute.
II. BACKGROUND
In Texas, the practice of telemedicine is governed by the laws and regu-
lations created by the Texas Medical Board (TMB) and codified in the
TAC.10 In 2011, the TMB notified Teladoc, Inc., a provider of telehealth
services, that it was in violation of § 190.8(1)(L) of the TAC.11 The TMB’s
letter to Teladoc explained that § 190.8(1)(L) required that, in order for a
telehealth provider to prescribe a “dangerous drug or controlled substance” to
a patient, a “proper professional relationship” must first be “establish[ed] . . .
through the use of acceptable medical practices such as . . . physical exami-
nation.”12 The letter explained the TMB’s interpretation of the statute and
accused Teladoc of violating it by prescribing medication after a telephone
7. John Daniel Davison, How a Lawsuit Could Impact the Future of Healthcare in
Texas, TEX. MONTHLY (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/
the-future-of-telemedicine-in-texas/.
8. See Wynter K. Miller, Trust and Antitrust: State-Based Restrictions in
Telemedicine, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1807, 1837–40 (2017).
9. See id. at 1843.
10. 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 174.1(a) (West 2018).
11. Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529, 534 (W.D. Tex. 2015).
12. Id.
2018] Telemedicine 91
consultation without a face-to-face examination.13 Teladoc responded by fil-
ing suit against the TMB claiming its interpretation of the statute constituted
an amendment to § 190.8 and was procedurally invalid.14 The trial court
agreed and held in Teladoc’s favor.15
The TMB subsequently issued an emergency rule amending
§ 190.8(1)(L).16 Similar to the original version of § 190.8, the new version of
the rule required an established physician-patient relationship for any pro-
vider, including telehealth providers, to prescribe dangerous drugs or con-
trolled substances.17 But, the amendment included additional language
stating that “[a] defined physician-patient relationship must include, at a min-
imum: . . . establishing a diagnosis through the use of acceptable medical
practices, which includes documenting and performing: . . . [a] physical ex-
amination that must be performed by either a face-to-face visit or in-person
evaluation.”18 The additional language effectively made the previously dis-
cretionary list of suggested actions mandatory.19
Teladoc consequently filed an action claiming that the TMB violated
antitrust law and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by adopting
the new version of § 190.8 and requested a preliminary injunction to prevent
its enforcement.20 The Court granted the preliminary injunction, holding that
Teladoc: (a) made a “prima facie showing that they were likely to succeed on
the merits of their claim under the Sherman Act”21; and (b) proved they
would face a substantial threat of irreparable injury if forced to comply with
the newly revised § 190.8.22
III. HOLDING AND RATIONALE
In siding with Teladoc, the Court noted that a preliminary injunction
may be granted if the moving party could establish: (1) a substantial likeli-
hood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that failure to grant the
injunction would result in irreparable injury; (3) the threatened injury out-
13. Id.
14. Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 453 S.W.3d 606, 612 (Tex. App.—Austin
2014, pet. denied).
15. Id. at 620.
16. Teladoc, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 534.
17. 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 190.8(1)(L) (West 2017).
18. Teladoc, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 534; see also 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 190.8(1)(L)(i) (West 2017).
19. See Teladoc, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 534.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 540.
22. Id. at 543.
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weighed any damage the injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4)
the injunction will not disserve the public interest.23
A. A Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The Court found Teladoc satisfied all of these elements.24 Teladoc
brought an antitrust claim asserting the TMB violated the Sherman Act.25
Teladoc argued the amended version of § 190.8 would reduce choice, access,
innovation, and overall supply of physician services, as well as increase over-
all health care costs.26 Teladoc’s argument persuaded the Court that the an-
ticompetitive nature of the amended section far outweighed any benefit the
amended section could provide to the community.27 In its analysis, the Court
recognized that all licensed physicians in the state of Texas, including those
employed by telehealth providers, are held to the same standard of ethics and
care, but rejected the idea that improving the safety of the public was a sub-
stantial enough interest to justify an anticompetitive policy enacted by a
group of professionals engaging in the anticompetitive conduct.28
B. Substantial Threat of Irreparable Injury
The Court held Teladoc proved it would face a substantial threat of ir-
reparable injury if it were forced to adhere to the new rule.29 The Court
agreed that the enactment of § 190.8(1)(L) would prohibit physicians from
providing medical care and services through telehealth providers, such as
Teladoc, by requiring face-to-face consultation.30 It was sympathetic to Te-
ladoc’s argument that the physicians employed by Teladoc would no longer
be able to provide health care by telephone, causing monetary losses Teladoc
likely would be unable to recover from the TMB.31
C. Balancing of Respective Interests
In considering the third and fourth elements required for an injunction,
the Court determined enforcement of the amended section would injure both
Teladoc and the public.32 While the TMB presented “only anecdotal evidence
of possible public harm,” Teladoc presented “countervailing anecdotal evi-
23. Id. at 535.
24. Id. at 544.
25. Teladoc, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 536.
26. Id. at 537.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 538.
29. See id. at 541.
30. See id.
31. See Teladoc, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 543.
32. See id.
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dence” that enforcement of the amended rule would cause significant finan-
cial injury to Teladoc, and would force medical expenses to increase for
consumers.33 In determining the risk of inappropriate prescriptions of danger-
ous drugs and controlled substances to consumers over the phone did not
constitute an “imminent peril to public health, safety, or welfare,” the Court
held in favor of Teladoc.34
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE COURT’S RATIONALE
The Court failed to consider the restrictive language in the statute that
narrowed the instances where face-to-face meetings are required to only
those involving the prescription of certain defined drugs.35 Instead, the Court
based its holding on erroneous antitrust grounds and essentially removed the
statutory protections preventing individuals with drug habits from “virtual-
doctor shopping” for dangerous drugs and controlled substances.36
A. Review of the Language of Section 190.8 and its Requirements
Section 190.8(1)(L) of the TAC governs the administration of prescrip-
tions for dangerous drugs or controlled substances.37 This section dictates
that before a doctor can prescribe dangerous drugs or controlled substances
to a patient, a physician-patient relationship must first be established.38 This
section specifically requires a “face-to-face or in-person evaluation” in order
to establish a physician-patient relationship.39
Importantly, the “face-to-face or in-person evaluation” requirement of
§ 190.8(1)(L) pertains only to the prescription of a “dangerous drug or con-
trolled substance.”40 The Court in Teladoc, Inc. erroneously applied this re-
quirement to all telemedicine consultations, as opposed to the narrower stated
application to consultations involving only the prescription of “dangerous
drugs” or “controlled substances.”41 A “dangerous drug” is defined as “[a]
device or a drug that is unsafe for self-medication and that is not included in
Schedules I through V or Penalty Groups 1 through 4 of the Texas Health
and Safety Code.”42 A “controlled substance” is defined as “a substance, in-
cluding a drug, an adulterant, and a dilutant, listed in Schedules I through V
33. See id. at 544.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 534.
36. See id. at 543.
37. See 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 190.8(1)(L) (West 2017).
38. See id.
39. See id. § 190.8(1)(L)(i)(II)(c).
40. Id. § 190.8(1)(L).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 172.2(g)(3).
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or Penalty Groups 1, 1-A, or 2-4.”43 Some of the drugs listed in these sec-
tions include typically abused drugs such as hydrocodone, morphine, opium,
and oxycodone.44
Penalty Group 3 specifically lists narcotics, as well as drugs categorized
as “having a potential for abuse associated with a stimulant effect” or a “de-
pressant effect on the central nervous system.”45 In contrast, prescription
drugs that are not typically habit forming or subject to abuse are not included
in either the “dangerous drug” category or the “controlled substance” cate-
gory.46 Section 190.8(1)(L) of the TAC does not prohibit the prescribing and
administering of prescription-strength drugs used in antibiotics or used to
treat sinus infections, allergic reactions, or fevers.47 The drugs specifically
covered by § 190.8(1)(L) are known to be abused or have severe psychologi-
cal effects on users.48 This distinction clearly demonstrates the statute’s fun-
damental purpose of requiring a face-to-face consultation before a
prescription may be written and issued for habit-forming or frequently
abused drugs.
B. Incorrect Interpretation and Application of Section 190.8(1)(L)
Section 190.8(1)(L) was not meant to prevent people from using
telehealth services or to prevent the prescription of drugs often used to treat
common, though severe, illnesses.49 Section 190.8(1)(L) was similarly not
meant to entirely prevent the prescription of dangerous drugs.50 It merely
sought to ensure certain drugs deemed to be dangerous by the state are only
prescribed for appropriate and accurate diagnoses. The state was not unrea-
sonable in deciding a doctor should be required to conduct an in person eval-
uation to determine whether an antidepressant, stimulant, opiate, or narcotic
is medically necessary. The drugs covered in § 190.8(1)(L) are substances
43. 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 172.2(g)(2).
44. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.102(3)(A) (West 2017).
45. Id. § 481.104 (a)(1)–(4).
46. See id. §§ 481.102, 481.104 (failing to appear in the statutory definitions are
non-habit-forming prescription drugs).
47. See id. §§ 481.102, 481.104 (failing to include drugs such as ibuprofen,
paracetamol, pseudoephedrine, or acetaminophen in penalty group lists—all in-
gredients found in prescription strength pain relievers, decongestants, and other
medications often prescribed for severe pain or illness).
48. See Joanna Moncreiff et al., The Psychoactive Effects of Psychiatric Medica-
tion: The Elephant in the Room, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. (Nov.
18, 2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4118946/.
49. See supra text accompanying note 47.
50. See 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 190.8(L) (West 2017) (lacking prohibition of pre-
scription of dangerous drugs in the statutory language; statutory language
merely places guidelines on the prescription process).
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that undoubtedly need to be regulated, and should only be prescribed as nec-
essary to address the mental or physical symptoms they are intended to re-
lieve. Accordingly, since a face-to-face meeting is far more likely than a
telephone meeting to reveal all symptoms relevant to an accurate diagnosis, a
face-to-face meeting is required when prescribing medications under this
Section.51
It is detrimental to public interest to allow the unfettered distribution of
certain drugs proven to harm a person’s life and livelihood.52 This assertion
is supported by the fact that other states have enacted similar statutes putting
limitations and restrictions on the prescription of dangerous drugs.53 In Flor-
ida, “[p]hysicians may not prescribe controlled substances through the use of
telemedicine unless the patient is in a hospital facility.”54 Similarly, in Vir-
ginia, “physicians may prescribe Schedule VI medication via telemedicine
when a doctor-patient relationship is established using face-to-face, two-way
real-time communications services.”55
In allowing doctors to prescribe controlled substances over the phone,
the Court erroneously held that “no imminent peril to public health, safety, or
welfare existed.”56 This argument is erroneous because permitting the pre-
scription of dangerous drugs and controlled substances without requiring a
doctor to determine medical necessity through a thorough, in-person mental
and physical examination essentially allows for the unrestricted distribution
of drugs and substances known to directly and detrimentally affect the health
and safety of the user, and harms the public at large.57 By incorrectly inter-
preting the scope of § 190.8(1)(L), the Court incorrectly applied the statute.
The Court’s ruling allowed for the arbitrary and unregulated distribution of a
wide variety of extremely dangerous drugs without requiring a doctor to con-
duct a physical examination to determine whether the drugs are medically
necessary.58
51. See Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529, 538 (W.D. Tex.
2015).
52. See NORAH D. VOLKOW, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUGS, BRAINS, AND
BEHAVIOR: THE SCIENCE OF ADDICTION (2014).
53. See generally Nathaniel M. Ferrante & Thomas B. Lacktman, Virginia
Telehealth Law: What You Need to Know, HEALTH CARE L. TODAY (Apr. 12,
2016), https://www.healthcarelawtoday.com/2016/04/12/4419/.
54. Jamaal R. Jones, Esq., Telemedicine and its Intersection with Mobile Health
Apps and Wearable Tech, JONES HEALTH LAW (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www
.joneshealthlaw.com/telemedicine-and-its-intersection-with-mobile-health-
apps-and-wearable-tech/.
55. Ferrante & Lacktman, supra note 53.
56. Teladoc, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 544.
57. See id.
58. See id.
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C. Holding and Rationale, Revisited
If the Court applied the intended, narrow version of the rule, the out-
come of the case would have been drastically different. The Court should
have interpreted this rule as requiring an in person evaluation before the pre-
scription of dangerous drugs, not before the prescription of all drugs. Had
the Court accurately analyzed the rule’s intended meaning, it would have
been clear there was no basis for an antitrust claim, no actual threat of irrepa-
rable injury, and no purpose for the rule other than to protect the health and
safety of the public.59
The Court was persuaded by Teladoc’s argument that implementing the
amended § 190.8 would result in an antitrust injury through the complete
elimination of all medical services provided through telehealth providers.
This violation would put physicians out of jobs, and consumers out of a rea-
sonable, inexpensive health care option.60 Had the amended rule been cor-
rectly interpreted, however, the Court would have realized the regulation of
dangerous drugs and controlled substances would not have prohibited physi-
cians altogether from providing health care services, as Teladoc claimed.61
Teladoc’s argument is irrational because the rule does not require that every
single evaluation or consultation be in person.62 The correct result would be
that patients would need an in person evaluation only to obtain prescriptions
for a very particular subset of drugs. The rule merely requires one consulta-
tion be in person to establish a physician-patient relationship, and that is only
if the patient is in need of a prescription for a controlled substance or a dan-
gerous drug.63 This standard clearly does not render a physician entirely inca-
pable of practicing medicine, thus disproving Teladoc’s antitrust argument.
Had the Court correctly interpreted § 190.8, it would have balanced all
respective interests differently. The Court believed that if § 190.8 applied,
the result would be the “destruction of Teladoc’s business model, and ability
to do business in Texas.”64 For the reasons stated above, this assertion is
incorrect. The regulation of controlled substances and dangerous drugs
would not result in the complete destruction of Teladoc’s business model.65
In fact, Teladoc did not put forth any evidence indicating what percentage of
its profits, if any, were made from calls which resulted in its doctors writing
prescriptions. Thus, there was no way for the Court to know what actual
damage applying § 190.8 would cause to Teladoc. However, since Teladoc
does not function solely to prescribe dangerous drugs and controlled sub-
59. 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 190.8 (1)(L) (West 2017).
60. See Teladoc, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 537.
61. See id. at 543.
62. See id.
63. 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 190.8(L)(i)(II)(c).
64. Teladoc, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 543.
65. See id.
2018] Telemedicine 97
stances, it is reasonable to conclude that their entire business model would
not be destroyed.66
Had the Court correctly interpreted § 190.8, it would have determined
that the regulation of controlled substances and dangerous drugs would not
have the fatal, irreparable impact on Teladoc and its business model that
Teladoc claimed.67 Had the Court correctly interpreted § 190.8, it would have
realized that Teladoc’s claims and evidence presented in trial were over-
reaching and overdramatic.68 Limiting access to controlled drugs does not
materially restrict a physician’s practice of medicine and does not constitute
an antitrust violation through anticompetitive impact.69 For those reasons,
and because the relevant statute was interpreted incorrectly and thus applied
improperly, the Court’s holding was erroneous.70
V. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT’S
ERRONEOUS RULING
One of the unfortunate results of the Court’s erroneous holding in this
case is the rationalization of a direct interference on a state’s explicit police
power. The Constitution reserves certain powers to the states.71 Indeed, in
one of the first and most fundamental U.S. Supreme Court cases, the Su-
preme Court held state health laws are governed by the state and are “not
within the power granted to Congress.”72 The idea that states have the spe-
cific and exclusive power to create and regulate laws pertaining to health and
health care was upheld in a later Supreme Court case, which stated that “[a]s
long as a State does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade . . . it retains
broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens.”73
Historically, courts have checked the state’s police power to regulate health
and health care statutes by requiring the states, in enacting such statutes, to
prove the statutes promote public health.74 Courts have only restricted a
state’s police power when the proposed statute constituted a “degree of re-
striction of personal liberty [that] was found to be unconscionable.”75
66. See id. at 533.
67. See id. at 541.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 536.
70. See Teladoc, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 536.
71. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. X.
72. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 3 (1824).
73. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986).
74. See Jorge E. Galva et al., Public Health Strategy and the Police Powers of the
State, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. (2005), https://www.ncbi.nlm
.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2569983/#B6.
75. Id.
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In Teladoc, Inc., the Court overreached in prohibiting Texas from exer-
cising its police power. The TMB cited various reasons why it believed
§ 190.8 addressed serious public health concerns.76 The Court rejected the
TMB’s concerns, calling them “anecdotal.”77 However, the Court did not call
TMB’s concerns unreasonable, irrational, unconscionable, or a restriction of
personal liberty.78 Judicial precedent dictates that it is clearly within a state’s
police power to establish laws and regulations promoting public health and
safety.79 Because the regulation proposed by the TMB was not unconsciona-
ble, did not restrict individual liberties, and was enacted to promote the
health and safety of the public, the Court’s holding was overreaching.
In preventing the application of the TMB’s rule, the Court erroneously
imposed their federal powers on an area designated to the states. While it is
undoubtedly important that state agencies, and the rules and regulations they
impose, be checked by the federal system, federal courts cannot subjectively
decide to reject a state’s proposed rules. In Teladoc, Inc., the Court believed
§ 190.8 would restrict citizens’ access to health care services.80 Had the
Court correctly interpreted § 190.8, it likely would have concluded the rule
did not restrict all access to health care, but rather imposed a reasonable
restriction on the prescription of dangerous drugs and controlled sub-
stances.81 Such a restriction is not excessive, and for that reason, the Court’s
holding was erroneous.
The Court’s holding could have alarming consequences. The Court only
briefly mentioned why it rejected the TMB’s public health and safety argu-
ments. The majority of its reasoning focused on the detriment that Teladoc
would suffer if § 190.8 applied instead of listing legitimate reasons why the
rule could be seen as overly-restrictive or unconscionable.82 In doing so, the
erroneous holding set a precedent for federal courts to arbitrarily restrain a
state’s police power. Because the Court did not thoroughly explain the judi-
cial or constitutional precedent supporting its decision to intervene and re-
strict the state’s police power, its holding permits a federal court to encroach
on a state’s rights without giving a valid reason for doing so. The holding in
Teladoc, Inc. unconstitutionally granted rights to the federal system which
are explicitly reserved to the states.83 Should federal courts in the future fol-
76. See Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529, 538 (W.D. Tex.
2015).
77. Id. at 544.
78. See Galva et al., supra note 74.
79. See Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
80. See Teladoc, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 540.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 543.
83. See id.
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low this precedent, it will completely disrupt the system of checks and bal-
ances that is a fundamental component of the U.S. Constitution.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt telemedicine is important, beneficial, and should be
practiced in the state of Texas. However, there is also no reason why the
enforcement of rules and regulations regarding the dispensing of dangerous
drugs and controlled substances should be restrained, absent any concerns
regarding unconscionability of the rule or the restriction of individual liber-
ties. The Court did the public a disservice in overextending the meaning of
§ 190.8. The rule at issue in the case was about the ability to prescribe dan-
gerous drugs. The Court, in misinterpreting the rule, erroneously made the
case about the general ability to practice telemedicine. The actual issue was a
small subtopic of the perceived issue. In misinterpreting the rule, the Court
unconstitutionally overreached, and unjustifiably intervened, in an area over
which the Constitution explicitly gives the states control. In rejecting the
state’s reasonable public policy argument, the Court threatened the health
and safety of the citizens of the state. As it stands, a person can be prescribed
dangerous drugs without an in person evaluation to ensure that those drugs
are medically necessary. It is not unreasonable to require an in person evalua-
tion for a doctor to prescribe dangerous drugs or controlled substances such
as narcotics, which affect a person’s central nervous system, and are often
used recreationally or abused.
Lastly, in expanding the scope of the issue, the Court addressed inappro-
priate and irrelevant antitrust accusations which would not have applied had
the Court correctly interpreted the rule at issue. This mistake erroneously
determined the outcome of the case and created a dangerous precedent. In
actuality, § 190.8 does not limit the general practice of telemedicine. The
rule merely limits the prescription and administration of controlled sub-
stances and decidedly dangerous drugs. Had the Court assessed the problem
correctly, it would have found the restriction reasonable and in the best inter-
ests of public health. For these reasons, the Court’s holding was erroneous,
and courts in the future would be wise to refer to this case with caution.
